The 2020 Election Integrity Partnership

The Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) was formed in July 2020 as a coalition of research entities focused on supporting real-time information exchange between the research community, election officials, government agencies, civil society organizations, and social media platforms.

Our objective was to detect and mitigate the impact of attempts to prevent or deter people from voting or to delegitimize election results. In March 2021 we published our final report. This page displays an archive of the work carried out by the EIP and its partners during the 2020 U.S. election.

The Final Report.

The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election.

Blog archive.

Blog posts and publications during the 2020 election cycle.


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Repeat Offenders: Voting Misinformation on Twitter in the 2020 United States Election
Election 2020, Rapid Response Guest User Election 2020, Rapid Response Guest User

Repeat Offenders: Voting Misinformation on Twitter in the 2020 United States Election

We look back at the set of misleading stories the EIP reviewed to identify which Twitter accounts consistently share false or misleading content about the upcoming election, and from where these accounts source this misleading information, and identified 43 cases. Across our dataset relating to these 43 incidents, more than 50% of all retweets can be traced back to “original” tweets from only 35 users (out of over 600K users in our dataset). We document how these users engaged in reframing, and decontextualization to spread misinformation.

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Evaluating Platform Election-Related Speech Policies
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Evaluating Platform Election-Related Speech Policies

With under three weeks to go until November 4, EIP has updated its social media platform policy analysis post to account for substantial changes made by the platforms in the past 2 months. Since first publishing this post in August 2020, we have seen constructive policy updates from Facebook (Instagram), Twitter, Pinterest, TikTok and Nextdoor. We evaluate these new policies against our 4 categories of election integrity. We’ve also updated the post to test these policies against scenarios of potential confrontations at polling stations, which represent difficult scenarios platforms may face in real time.

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Seeking To Help and Doing Harm: The Case of Well-Intentioned Misinformation
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Seeking To Help and Doing Harm: The Case of Well-Intentioned Misinformation

We have identified several instances of apparently well-meaning but misleading content, which typically takes the form of flawed public-service announcements or calls to action. Such content that seeks to help but does harm is best characterized as well-intentioned misinformation: false or misleading information which — if it were not false — would be spread toward constructive ends. This post is motivated by the idea that by describing prototypical cases of well-intentioned misinformation, and by outlining best practices to contain its spread, we might reduce the threat it poses to the upcoming election.

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The Ballot Harvesting Trope
Election 2020, Rapid Response Elena Cryst Election 2020, Rapid Response Elena Cryst

The Ballot Harvesting Trope

Ballot collecting, or ballot harvesting as it is more adversarily known, is legal either with or without restrictions in 26 states. The practice in its simplest form allows a designated agent to deliver an absentee or vote-by-mail ballot on behalf of a voter. Proponents say it increases voter turnout by limiting the barriers to vote. Opponents say it can enable bad actors to change or destroy ballots. In the past month, EIP has received and analyzed numerous reports related to ballot harvesting. Some contained no falsifiable claims and were therefore unactionable under our procedures. Others had already received widespread coverage from media outlets. We see this complex topic as a repeated narrative leading up to the election.

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Uncertainty and Misinformation: What to Expect on Election Night and Days After
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Uncertainty and Misinformation: What to Expect on Election Night and Days After

Democracy depends on trust in elections; that trust is under attack. We explore different examples of false narratives that we are likely to see during these different periods — a chaotic Election Day, an uncertain election night, and during a predicted “Blue Wave” (or alternatively a “Red Wave”) shift in ballot counts. We also provide some suggestions for how we (as members of the public and public communicators) might want to approach the emergence of certain misleading narratives, in terms of pre-bunking, debunking, or coveraging them as they spread.

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Analysis of Wednesday’s foreign election interference announcement
Election 2020, Rapid Response Elena Cryst Election 2020, Rapid Response Elena Cryst

Analysis of Wednesday’s foreign election interference announcement

This week has seen a flurry of activity related to potential voter suppression, starting with the sending of threatening emails, purportedly from the Proud Boys, to voters in several states; the release of a video purporting to show the hacking of voter registration databases; and finally the attribution of this activity to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the United States government.

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