Rumors, Conspiracy Theories, and Unsubstantiated Claims About Voting: What to Expect on and After Election Day 2022
The Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) looks back on some of our “What to Expect” predictions from the 2020 elections, as well as new voting-related narratives we anticipate to take shape heading into Election Day 2022, on Election Day, and in the days that will follow.
Many rumors about Election Day will surface in the weeks after the election, particularly in cases where uncertainty around election results has been extended by a close result, recount, litigation, or a candidate’s refusal to concede.
As in 2020, rumors, conspiracy theories, and misleading narratives about the 2022 U.S. midterm election are following a familiar progression: Interested parties gathering “evidence,” delegitimizing results, and calling for action.
One big difference this time around: Election fraud narratives are now deeply familiar to audiences that had only a passing familiarity with them two years ago.
Photo above: A “Vote Here” sign outside a precinct location in Ypsilanti Township, Michigan. Photo by Corey Seeman / Flickr via CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
This Election Integrity Partnership (EIP) analysis was written by Mike Caulfield of the University of Washington’s Center for an Informed Public (UWCIP), with contributions from Stephen Prochaska (UWCIP), Kate Starbird (UWCIP), Renée DiResta of Stanford Internet Observatory, Emma S. Spiro (UWCIP), Sukrit Venkatagiri (UWCIP), and Michael Grass (UWCIP).
Introduction: Returning to Prediction
Two years ago, the EIP published a “What to Expect” article ahead of the 2020 U.S. election. The world was in a different place, and the presidential election was unprecedented in two major ways. First, changes in election procedures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic created uncertainty and confusion — fertile ground for election rumors and conspiracy theory. Second, and more importantly, the sitting president himself actively promoted misinformation and conspiracy theories about electoral processes before, during, and then after the election — a situation with no modern historical parallel in U.S. history.
In 2020, to envision what sort of stories would predominate during and after the 2020 election, we looked at some of the more persistent false narratives around past elections. We were particularly interested in those that fit a false narrative that had become dominant in the days before the election — that late-arriving votes were suspect and late shifts in vote share were suspicious. This narrative selected for a specific set of historically familiar rumors: the “mysterious” discovery of late ballots, false stories around drop box chain of custody, and stories that attributed shifts in vote composition to rigged or untrustworthy machines. That fit proved predictive as most of the stories we saw in the days after the election were in service of one fundamental goal: providing a convincing counter-narrative for a predictable shift in votes as mail-in votes were counted in the hours and days after in-person voting concluded.
In that work we drew, in part, from the narratives and tactics that our analysts had surfaced in the weeks leading up to the election, as well as knowledge of organized efforts to collect “evidence” of potential electoral fraud from everyday people via social media and online forms — such as the Trump campaign’s “Defend Your Ballot” initiative. We also leaned on our knowledge of narratives that had emerged — both on the political left and political right — in previous elections or primaries. Our list of Election Day evidence likely to be marshaled highlighted a set of elements that still stands as a solid prediction:
We predicted mundane videos of ballots being moved would be miscontextualized as “mysterious” ballots being added (as we ended up seeing in the rumors about the TCF Center in Detroit, and in the claims of “suitcases full of ballots”).
We noted there would be theories about actions poll workers took to sabotage ballots, perhaps by stray markings (as we saw in Sharpiegate in Arizona).
We suggested that videos of rather mundane procedures during the counting and canvassing process would be miscast as poll worker collusion (as we saw in Maryland and many other places)
And while we may have been a bit early, we predicted conflict around drop boxes, with videos of voters supposedly dropping off more ballots than allowed portrayed as part of a sinister conspiracy.
A snippet from “Uncertainty and Misinformation: What to Expect on Election Night and Days After,” October 26, 2020. We also predicted other trends as well, such as the use of affidavits and legal maneuvers to generate press coverage of allegations and launder claims into the general discourse.
The conditions in 2020 were extraordinarily novel; in 2022, the pandemic has waned and there is no presidential election — or president inclined to preemptively allege election fraud. But what were once predictions are now part of history. So how is this election — the 2022 U.S. midterm election — different? And how is it the same?
A Familiar Progression: Gathering “Evidence,” Delegitimizing Results, Calling for Action
Some of the progression from election night to the days after will be familiar from 2020. Since many rumors work from the available evidence to the story — and not from the story to the evidence — certain types of election rumors are persistent because many elements of the election environment don’t change. The specific details, however, may shift. For instance, in 2020 in Arizona, “theories about actions poll workers take to eliminate or alter ballots by party” manifested as Sharpiegate. While that theory still had traction in the 2022 Arizona primary, the new form it took was that Republicans were intentionally being denied ballots altogether based on a (supposedly) intentional ballot shortage.
While concerns about Sharpies were shown to be without basis, it is important to note that in some cases the stories we see may be true, at least in part. The challenge of election rumor is not simply disproving the false, but finding and addressing those stories that are plausible, some of which can be an early warning of real issues requiring attention. As one example, the shortage of Republican ballots in an Arizona county during the primary election represented a real issue requiring attention — even if the framing of that issue as intentional was false.
While we will not detail all of the likely stories to emerge, here is a sample of common stories we expect to see around the U.S. midterms on Tuesday, November 8, 2022. At a high level, most resemble stories from 2020, with the variations being a matter of detail.
Election Day
On Election Day we expect to see a flood of content — photos, videos, and textual accounts — documenting the voting experiences of everyday Americans. Other content will not be rooted in personal experience, but may instead relay suspicious activity purportedly observed by others.
Some Election Day rumors will emerge on Election Day itself but there will be many more rumors about Election Day will surface in the weeks after the election, particularly in cases where the election period has been lengthened by a close result, recount, litigation, or a candidate’s refusal to concede.
These rumors may include:
Reports about ballots, voting machines, or voting paraphernalia being rigged in such a way to confuse, alter, or discard one’s vote. For example, stories about materials shortages or machines being “suspiciously” down; ballots that seem designed to confuse or discard one’s vote; or supposed methods that force ballot “adjudication,” a process that has attracted a good deal of conspiracism in the past couple of years.
Reports of poll worker collusion, where those running voting locations are said to use their position to suppress, influence, or alter votes. These might include personal accounts from those voting, but may also include accounts from fellow election workers.
Reports that the U.S. Postal Service is intentionally suppressing mail-in ballots through late delivery (likely a left-leaning perspective) or is “colluding” to allow invalid ballots in (likely a right-leaning perspective).
Reports of voter intimidation by law enforcement, election workers, politically-affiliated organizations, or the general public.
Reports of suspicious voters, vehicles, or others near polling locations or ballot drop boxes, or a suspicious laxness of election officials in security procedures. These stories may involve descriptions of people perceived to be non-citizens, or non-residents.
Initially, much of this content will be shared directly to social media by eyewitnesses. It will gain visibility as other users, including influencers with large audiences, amplify it. More strategic actors will reframe, decontextualize, or exaggerate the impact of the content to align with existing political narratives that fit the audience or region, though for particularly salient narratives little reframing may be required. As we’ve seen in countless examples, the success of one sort of story will encourage other stories of that type, particularly if the story has a participatory element — something that makes the audience feel like they can add their own experience as they share it.
The specific stories that emerge will be familiar, with a bit of novelty. We have found in our work a bit of newness matters, both because audiences are more attentive to the novel, and because many narratives form around a set of distinct events. The elements of the discarded mail narrative of 2020— seemingly suspicious activity tied to mail delivery of ballots — were reflected in the “mail truck on fire” rumors of 2022. Concerns about out-of-commission machines as a conspiracy to limit access in 2020 emerge in 2022 in the form of a shortage of ballots in the primary, falsely framed by partisans as intentional.
Election Night
As the polls close, the focus will move to counting and results. During Election Day, the general impression created will have been one of confusion in many races, and as we move to election night certain rumors will have gained more traction. While stories about the voting process will continue to emerge and circulate for weeks after the election, as results begin to come in, an additional set of stories focused on the counting and reporting of votes will start to emerge.
As shifts occur in vote share over the night, the first rumors around results will attempt to frame those shifts as statistically suspicious or implausible. Errors in the presentation of results on television will take on outsized significance, as will provisional vote counts shared by states. One likely permanent effect of the 2020 election: the leveraging of expected and unremarkable shifts in vote composition over the course of the post-election day period is here to stay.
Though well-known explanations exist for such errors and shifts, those looking to delegitimize the election will turn to two major narratives to create alternate explanations. First, it will be claimed that mysterious or unverified late ballots arrived at counting locations. These will be presented as invalid ballots that were let into the system wrongly. Second, it will be alleged that the results were digitally altered, either through a hack of voting machines, or by design of voting machine software.
Expect the proliferation of 24/7 web-available streams of counting locations combined with large numbers of partisan poll-watchers and election workers to produce a steady stream of reports, photos, and video of supposedly suspicious behavior of those counting votes. In some cases these reports may have merit and even be quite serious, but in the majority of them expect relatively mundane, routine actions to be recast as suspicious behavior. Many of these claims will be in the form of observer reports and challenges, filed later as affidavits and rolled into post-election litigation narratives.
Finally, as the night wears on, expect a major focus of narratives about voting and counting to focus on obstruction of oversight. In these accounts, the central focus will not be any specific fraud, but an allegation that either citizen or government oversight is being illegally blocked, or that materials crucial to that oversight are being destroyed. Such narratives will be fueled in part by mobilized partisans who may often not understand the existing laws on what they are allowed to film, observe, and the ways in which they are and are not empowered to intervene.
The Day After and Beyond
After election night, the focus will narrow. As the public wakes up on Wednesday, November 9 to find some races still in play and some races in which their candidate unexpectedly lost, partisans will swing their attention to the rumors most relevant to those races, seeking to amplify them and spin them into larger stories. Here are some things we expect:
Calls to stop the counting or override a result altogether will gain steam. Videos, pictures, and reports of counting activities will take center stage, possibly leading to harassment of those present, while at the same time stories missed in the rush of Election Day will resurface, connected to larger narratives, as we saw with “Sharpiegate” in Maricopa County, Arizona, which didn’t start gaining traction online until the morning after voting ended in 2020.
Efforts to use misleading narratives to mobilize — for example in protests at vote-counting locations — will set the stage for confrontations that become fodder for additional claims, e.g., of obstruction of oversight.
If candidates do not concede, or decide to litigate the election, this period will extend, with each day selecting some piece of election-day or counting-period evidence to amplify or extend. The lengthened period will allow media and theories that fought for attention on Election Day to be rolled out serially, with each forming a brick in a larger narrative. A litigation period will also allow numerous election day and counting period claims to be recycled as affidavits and testimony, both in court and in legislative hearings.
As delegitimization narratives and obstruction of oversight narratives proliferate, a third type of narrative will emerge: rumors about alternative mechanisms to either intervene in the election or decide it. Such narratives can cut both ways. Claims might emerge that a legal recount is not permitted when it is, or alternatively argue that a recount or audit is required when it is not. Some narratives will propose even more dubious methods for intervention.
Though there is not an equivalent of the Electoral Count Act in the midterm elections, the same sort of rumoring that led many to believe that the U.S. vice president could overturn the results of the Electoral College will lead to hardcore partisans proposing extreme, ahistorical methods for intervening in or overturning this year’s elections.
Ways In Which This Election Will Be Different From 2020
Though many of the rumors that will go viral are “old wine in new bottles” — familiar narratives updated with novel elements — over the past two years there have been some shifts in both the information environment and audience orientation that we wish to highlight. These shifts may influence the types of rumors which gain attention, and influence the ways in which those rumors develop, spread, and ultimately result in action.
Broad Familiarity With Election Fraud Narratives
Election fraud narratives are now deeply familiar to certain audiences that had only a passing familiarity with them before. As we have seen in our own work, much of what needed to be explained (to receptive audiences) as narrative in 2020 no longer requires a gloss. The recent burning of a postal vehicle is a good example: an individual instance of a postal vehicle catching fire in October 2018 would have been perceived by most audiences, including those on the political right, as a sign that the post offices vehicles or a particular driver were not up to standard. Today, however, the same story is circulated, shared by right-leaning influencers, and for their audience it evokes malintent, and a complex “discarded votes” narrative — without any individual having to explicitly state or elaborate on that theory. A far larger percentage of a distrustful public now assumes malice, and expects fraud.
The effect of this familiarity is uncertain, but just as a science fiction writer can quickly convey a complex and compelling story to readers by including familiar archetypes or common elements of the genre, we expect many narratives that took weeks to build in 2020 will take mere days to develop this time around.
Recommendations: While the full range of election fraud lore is too vast for most communications professionals to master, those communicating about specific election processes, whether they be verification procedures, counting, canvassing, or the reporting of results should familiarize themselves with existing narratives around those specific procedures. Even a short check of this sort may help one avoid language that unintentionally adds fuel to baseless speculation, or reveal areas where more context might be necessary.
As these narratives become more familiar, communication about individual rumors should attempt to address them at the narrative level, rather than at the level of the rumor alone. For instance, in talking about emerging rumors it may be helpful to contextualize them historically, especially in the early stages of diffusion where specific information about them may not be available. Letting audiences know that a particular rumor in 2022 is a rehash of a debunked story from 2020 which was itself a version of a false story from 2004 can help the public understand how to evaluate emerging information about election events, even when specific knowledge of them is provisional or incomplete. By addressing the underlying structures that produce rumors, communicators can close the gap between emergence and response, and better prepare the public to evaluate new claims on their own.
Less General Amplification and Interest, but More Elite Adoption
Midterm elections always garner less attention than general elections, and while this may be a higher engagement midterm than most, we observe the overall trend holding in our data collection and analysis. While misinformation about 2022 election processes is just now ramping up in the week before the election, over the past three months our team has seen more discourse about the 2020 election than 2022. Additionally, much discussion formerly on mainstream platforms such as Twitter and Facebook is taking place on alt-tech platforms, such as Telegram and Truth Social. Recent changes in leadership at Twitter, and perceptions that those will accompany revisions in policies around misinformation, may disrupt some of these recent trends, at least on that platform.
We still anticipate a flood of rumor, misinformation, and disinformation on major platforms. At the same time we anticipate that many of the narratives that may motivate and mobilize highly-engaged audiences to support the subversion of the election may be less visible to the general public. Though this may seem comforting, it is not necessarily so: to the extent people of power and influence consume these narratives, or groups mobilize around them, there can be consequences for the public even if the public does not encounter them directly in their feeds, and to the extent that partisan media draws their stories from these channels, they can be introduced to the public in time.
Recommendations: One largely positive development over the past few years has been that reporters and editors consider the level of spread of a narrative before covering it and inadvertently amplifying it. Yet as these narratives have found more direct routes to people with power, that calculus has become more complicated; a false story can have historic impact if a politician, judge, or sheriff believes it, or if those in positions of power can’t find good information debunking it. That impact is felt whether or not a large portion of the population has been exposed to it. Mobilization around these narratives produces additional variables to consider.
Though it is important not to amplify fringe narratives, many on the front lines of election work need to know the current claims out there (and the issues with them) to do their jobs. We saw this earlier this year as election administrators were fielding repeated requests for cast vote records long before reporting on the underlying claims emerged.
While we don’t have clear rules of thumb, we encourage reporters to consider power and impact as well as spread in deciding when to cover claims and when to engage in strategic silence. In particular, if those with power may be confronted with the rumor and need to find trustworthy information about it to make decisions, consider whether leaving the data void open is worth the benefits of not amplifying the narrative, especially in a space that is already saturated with other election misinformation and conspiracy theory narratives. If it is not, work to close the void.
Mobilization Around “Election Integrity” Concerns Has Changed the Landscape
There have always been groups that have organized around false claims about election conspiracy; however, claims made during and after the 2020 election mobilized a vastly larger public. The resulting organizations are far more tactical and mobilized as we head into November 2022.
With increased mobilization comes a more direct connection between information and action. As just one example, local “election integrity” groups have popped up across the country, and though many appear on the surface to be “grassroots,” they in reality have connections with local/national GOP branches or politically influential people who have helped organize. Such organization helped facilitate the “drop box parties” of the last weeks, taking an offhand online comment and turning it into reality. As rumor outruns better information in the days after the election, expect it to mobilize action quickly. If the recent trend of drop box surveillance is a guide, it may do so in ways that have potential for conflict and escalation.
Recommendations: In evaluating information, a key principle is to understand the process through which it was produced, and the aims of those who produced it. For events on social media, those origins are often invisible to the public: it can feel to the average reader that most stories emerging are free of intent or coordination. Increases in organization and mobilization around these concerns make that less likely to be the case.
When reporting and sharing information about stories that have roots in or are supported by coordinated efforts, explaining how organizations and influencers helped to mobilize these seemingly “grassroots” events or citizen reports is crucial. A well-established finding in the study of rumor is that audiences rely on rumor provenance to make informed evaluations about veracity; good reporting that makes such origins clear will be even more important as we move into this election.
Obstruction of Oversight and Destruction of Evidence Narratives Are More Central
As noted above, mobilization around election doubt has intensified. Last election, voters were primed to document their own experiences. But as we have seen with both surveillance around dropboxes and calls for partisan activists to take positions as poll watchers and election workers, many people are set not only to document their own experiences, but to actively attempt to gather “evidence” in more systematic ways.
Adding to the potential for conflict, people gathering this evidence may not have clear ideas about what boundaries exist. We saw this play out in the 2020 election, when election officials covered up windows to protect the privacy of ballots from those filming them. The event became a central component of Big Lie election lore. Other similar stories emerged in the days after: claims that mobile shredding trucks were destroying evidence, or that chain of custody documents had been forged or lost.
Given the increase in the number of people attempting to systematically collect such evidence, we predict there will be even more stories that focus on supposed “cover-ups” of election fraud, in addition to those focusing on election fraud alone. We’ve already seen some signs of this among the most mobilized, as when the reporting of a privacy flaw in Dominion machines was framed by activists as a “smokescreen” intended to reduce their ability to analyze election records, thereby supposedly covering up fraud.
Recommendations: The ability of citizens to observe and oversee elections is a cornerstone of democracy, and election transparency is one of the key pillars of election integrity. That said, as with all policy, state and local election officials develop compromises to resolve competing goods. The right to observe voting must also be implemented in a way that preserves the right of voters to vote free from intimidation. Transparency of tabulation must be implemented in ways that preserve the privacy of the ballot, and the safety of election workers.
Election officials and press should be knowledgeable about the regulations around citizen and party oversight, such as the use of photography, required distance between observers and workers or voters, or maintenance of records. Because of the chance of increased conflict around these rules, it is particularly important those charged with enforcing them be well-versed in the details, and prepared to de-escalate conflict. Above all, communicators should work to stress the importance of transparency while communicating that their job is to provide meaningful transparency while preserving other rights, and ensuring the peaceful and efficient conduct of the election process.
Calls for Intervention by “Alternative” Authorities, or Refusals to Certify
There are three categories of rumors about election integrity. The first category is the category most commonly discussed — direct claims of election fraud. The second category involves claims of a cover-up, in which the focus is not election fraud itself, but supposed attempts to conceal it. The final category is far less discussed, but perhaps the most important: claims about what constitutes a legitimate remedy to the supposed fraud.
In 2020, we saw this play out in the months after the election. Rumors and misinformation about conduct on election night were combined with misinformation about shredding trucks, obstructed windows, and lost chain of custody documents to create the impression of a broadly fraudulent election that traditional institutions were covering up. Parallel to this a cottage industry for the third type of claim emerged — alternative ways of intervening in or deciding the election. This type of misinformation led to visible, tragic results on January 6, 2021, when Trump supporters, convinced by their social networks and media environment that Vice President Pence could invalidate the election, marched on the U.S. Capitol.
The midterms have no equivalent to the Electoral Count Act, but other theories of election intervention have emerged over the past two years. Notably, there has been a persistent assertion that county sheriffs have a broad purview in the running and oversight of elections, with more traditional calls for voters to call state election fraud hotlines replaced with calls by some to call their county sheriffs. Likewise, there have been trial balloons concerning whether other county authorities could simply refuse to certify an election to throw the state results into chaos.
We can’t say if such calls will be answered, but signs exist that certain audiences are primed to make them. We’ve seen reports that poll watchers have been told by activist groups to “call 911” if they see evidence of fraud. Prominent candidates have told others to “call the sheriff” if they suspect election misconduct, part of a larger effort to radically expand the role of county sheriff’s departments in election oversight, in ways that have no legal basis. Other county government bodies are being encouraged to expand their roles, under equally unsubstantiated claims. These authorities might serve to amplify misinformation through press releases about investigations initiated, or could choose to take even more active roles.
In 2020 our predictions did not encompass misinformation about certifying authorities and election oversight roles. The past two years have made it abundantly clear that this type of electoral misinformation is some of the most consequential out there, and should be monitored closely and rebutted forcefully.
Recommendations: How elections are overseen, managed, investigated and certified can be difficult to explain to the general public. The variation in state-level laws makes the task even more challenging. In the event that calls for alternative oversight or certification after the election emerge, reporters and election authorities should be prepared to explain how their particular state’s laws work, and what the normal procedure is for overseeing and certifying elections. Ideally, reporters would have explainers on the processes in their state ready to go. Additionally, announcements about fraud investigations initiated by institutions without traditional oversight authority should be carefully contextualized for the reader or viewer, whose most pressing question when trying to make sense of them is whether such investigations represent the normal operation of the election system, or a radical breach of historical norms.
Real Threats and Damaging Rumors About Them
Every election, communicators struggle with a thorny problem: how does one communicate about emerging, uncorroborated rumors, the majority of which are likely to be false, without prematurely dismissing those which will turn out to be true? This is particularly important during the voting and counting period, where the job of the press and election officials is not to “fight misinformation,” but is more properly conceived as “accelerating the resolution of rumor”: that is, quickly determining the veracity of a report so that real threats to election integrity can be dealt with quickly, while false threats and confusion can be addressed with better information.
When real threats are present, however, the situation can become even more complex. Small acts of intimidation or suppression, when amplified or exaggerated, can discourage far more people from voting than acts of intimidation alone. Exposed technological vulnerabilities, even when not exploited, can through false context damage election integrity through allowing those defeated to contest or overturn the people’s will.
While each election has real threats, a number of converging elements could complicate this election in particular. First, the U.S. is involved in an intense geopolitical conflict with Russia, an adversary with a history of attempting to sow chaos in U.S. elections, and while certain bright lines around limits of hacking have prevailed in the past, it is unclear if Russia’s current struggle may push them towards more aggressive cyber attacks. If these attacks occur, experts have hypothesized that they may be “hybrid attacks,” combining an attack on some element of U.S. technology with a disinformation campaign about that attack. As a simple example, it might be possible to compromise a low-level system in a visible attack, but spread misinformation that exaggerates the impact of that attack on election results, or attempts to attribute it to another state actor.
Likewise, appropriate attention has been given to recent actions around voter surveillance, including surveillance by armed activists, in a trend that has potential to cause conflict on election day. But as voters go to the polls it’s worth realizing that exaggerations of acts that intimidate serve not only to call attention to the practice, but amplify their impact. A small phenomenon, blown out of proportion, can serve to suppress many more votes than the act alone, as people in a wide variety of locations become wrongfully convinced it is not safe to vote.
Finally, we are looking at the first election where a significant number of people that have signed up for its administration do not believe in the integrity of the process, and may believe that the election process as a whole is merely organized theft. We’ve already seen a number of events where those with this belief have compromised the integrity of the election themselves, through tampering with equipment or security breaches. Experts expect as the election proceeds we will see more of this behavior, whether undertaken in a misguided attempt to prove fraud, or in an attempts to “fight fire with fire”: if some election workers truly believe that there are no safeguards against election fraud and that the system is hopelessly corrupt, they may be sorely tempted to engage in it themselves.
It’s quite possible that none of these scenarios will emerge — that foreign powers will stay (largely) out of the election, that conflict and potential intimidation around polling places will cool as potential legal consequences become apparent to participants, and that fears of “insider threat” will turn out to be overblown. But these threats are decidedly intensified in this election. And if any of the three occurs, there is a good possibility that exaggeration of impact, scale, or coordination could do more damage than the threat itself.
Recommendations: The recommendation here is surprisingly simple, and echoes the recommendation we have provided on subjects from errors in voter information to electronic pollbook breaches: focus on impact and scale. What the public needs to know, in the case of any real threat or error, is what the impacts may be, and at what scale. In the case of hacking, this involves clarity on whether vote totals were impacted or not. In the case of intimidation, voters want to know if their own polling place is safe, and if the intimidation — without the panic media coverage of it may cause — is significant enough to alter the course of the election. And with insider threat, the question in the foreground — at least in the early days after the election — is whether the misconduct affected the election, either through increasing chaos at the polls or through altering the results.
In all cases, such threats deserve deeper dives and nuanced treatments. But in the early days as emerging threats come to the fore, focus first on conveying the best estimate in the moment of impact and scale, while noting its potential to change as more information comes to light.
A Note on Rumor and Truth
As always — the tricky aspect of rumor is not that it is false, but that it sometimes turns out to be true. We should note that sometimes oversight is wrongly obstructed. Insider threat is a real worry. Voting machines are historically secure and accurate but require transparency and vigilance to maintain our trust. And errors occur. But by understanding the post-election stories that will emerge, even in absence of evidence, we can better prepare to address substantive claims with action and spurious claims with better information.
Looking Forward
Two years after the 2020 election, our democratic institutions are under more stress than ever before. False narratives about election integrity have been increasingly adopted by elites, and for many voters the embrace of such theories is a litmus test. As we head towards a tumultuous election day — and at the very least a number of contentious post-election weeks — many of us worry about the integrity of our vote, and the health of our democracy. Clearly, our society has a great deal of work to do to build trust in our election processes, to make them stronger and more fair, to eliminate systematic voter suppression, and to prevent actual fraud.
Productive criticism is designed to make something stronger. But another kind of criticism — the kind that we are encountering repeatedly in this election cycle — is meant only to break things down. Certain political actors seek to exploit the weaknesses in our voting and information systems, sowing doubt in our processes to advance their own political objectives. These manipulations destabilize the foundations of our democracy — causing us to lose trust in our democratic processes, our information providers, and ultimately, each other. Our hope is that by better understanding these dynamics and identifying ways to counter them, we can become more resistant to manipulation and consequently stronger as a society.